Back in April 2006, Niklas Zennström, Skype’s chief executive, told The Financial Times (Skype says texts are censored by China) in an interview about Skype's joint venture partner in China, Tom Online:
“Tom had implemented a text filter, which is what everyone else in that market is doing,” said Mr Zennström. “Those are the regulations.”
He claimed that compliance with Chinese censorship was no different from obeying rules governing business in western countries. China, along with the US and Germany, is one of Skype’s three biggest markets in terms of active users of its free telephony service, which routes encrypted calls between computers via the internet.
The advice to foreign reporters posted by Reporters Without Borders can be found at Reporters sans frontières - Beijing Games 2008. The advice itself, which includes a recommendation not to use the Chinese version of Skype and how to access blocked websites via proxies, gives some indication of what reporters are up against getting information within, into and out of the PRC. Here are the first three:
Reporters Without Borders therefore offers the following practical advice to foreign journalists to help them cover the human rights situation in China.
1. Install programmes on your computer that will help you to circumvent firewalls and protect your communications. Before going to China, you should install Tor (www.torproject.org/index.html.en), Psiphon (http://psiphon.civisec.org/) or Proxify (https://proxify.com/). The international version of Skype is recommended, rather than the one available in China, which is not secure. It is also advisable to encrypt emails with PGP (http://www.pgpi.org). More information is available in the Reporters Without Borders Handbook for Bloggers and Cyber-Dissidents: http://www.rsf.org./article.php3?id_article=26187
2. Protect your computer against Trojan viruses and ensure that it is password-protected. Do not leave your equipment and contact lists in an accessible condition in a hotel room.
3. When making phone calls or sending emails, bear in mind that there is no guarantee of confidentiality. Use several SIM cards, especially when contacting “sensitive” people.
There were a number of news reports late 2007 about the German police trying to hack / eavesdrop on Skype. Also reports that the Austrian Police have alluded to a backdoor into Skype. The German solution seems to be to install Trojans on computers remotely. According to Reuters ( Skype encryption stumps German police) back in November 2007:
"The encryption with Skype telephone software ... creates grave difficulties for us," Joerg Ziercke, president of Germany's Federal Police Office (BKA) told reporters at an annual gathering of security and law enforcement officials. "We can't decipher it. That's why we're talking about source telecommunication surveillance -- that is, getting to the source before encryption or after it's been decrypted."... Ziercke said there was a vital need for German law enforcement agencies to have the ability to conduct on-line searches of computer hard drives of suspected terrorists using "Trojan horse" spyware.
The computer security industry must not be happy about the development of what is variously called "white-hat malware", "remote forensic software" or "a law enforcement Trojan". How do you design anti-virus software that customers will trust if it has to - in agreement with various Governments - allow the "white-hats" in? And who chooses or manipulates which "good guys" to let in: US, German, Chinese, Nigerian?
Stories about Skype in China began with "filtering" (censoring) certain words and terms. But to describe the Chinese Skype as "not secure" implies a little more. It is suspected that the Chinese Skype comes with a Trojan pre-fitted.
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